“May God harmonize between their hearts for the good of their people.”
Saudi state prosecutors are seeking the death penalty in the case of prominent cleric and religious scholar Salman al-Audah. His supposed crime: tweeting the above quote to his more than 14 million followers on Twitter during the continuing dispute with Qatar in September 2017. Al-Audah faces 37 counts, including “incitement against the ruler” and “spreading discord.”
Salman al-Audah achieved prominence in Saudi Arabia when he, along with Safar al-Hawali, lead the “Sahwa” Islamic opposition movement that challenged the authority of the Saudi government in the early 1990s. Even though the movement ultimately failed and resulted in the imprisonment of al-Audah and al-Hawali from 1994 to 1999, it remains the most expansive challenge to the rule of the Saudi monarchy since 1979. The arrest and imprisonment of Salman point to the realization that the greatest threat to the continued rule of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman — apart from perhaps the royal family itself — comes from a re-emergence of the Sahwa movement.
Recently the new, young Saudi crown prince was enjoying a honeymoon. American journalists including Thomas Friedman, tech company executives such as Mark Zuckerburg, and American celebrities including the Rock are lauding him. Some call him a reformer and even a visionary for lifting the ban on women driving, criticizing religious extremism in Saudi Arabia, and announcing ambitious plans for economic development.
Salman’s “Vision 2030” aims to use the United Arab Emirates as a model for economic development and greater social freedom, to be accompanied with zero political reform or freedom. Socially, Mohammad bin Salman wants to reduce Saudi Arabia’s orientation around a conservative interpretation of Islam, and replace it with a sense of Saudi national identity. In pursuing this goal, the Saudi leader claims he is returning Saudi Arabia to the nation’s “true” character and the “moderate” Islam that characterized the country before the Iranian revolution.
Not unlike Donald Trump, Mohammad bin Salman is an ambitious risk-taker. However, the risks that Salman has taken so far have yet to bear much fruit. The war in Yemen seems to have no end in sight. Qatar has survived the Saudi-led embargo without making concessions. Only time will tell how effective the economic reforms have been. However, none of these challenges represents the threat to the rule of Salman and perhaps the al-Saud family as abandoning Islam as the guiding force of Saudi government and society.
There are three points to keep in mind when assessing the risk of abandoning Islam as the axis of the state: Oil states are not invincible, Saudi Arabia is not an old country, and every Saudi state has based its legitimacy on a connection to Islam.
There are many important differences between Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Cooperation Counci states. Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and even Oman have small populations of only a few million people or fewer and should be classified more as wealthy city-states than “real” nations. It is much easier for them to care for their small populations through their immense wealth of natural resources.
Among the other large states of the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Iran have already removed their kings. Saudi Arabia is the final kingdom. That would seem to disprove the notion that it is hard to overthrow governments in oil-states.
It should not be forgotten that only “true” revolution that occurred in the Middle East was in Iran, where there was a monarch, an economy based heavily on oil and natural gas, and strong foreign support for the regime. In spite of all these factors, the House of Pahlavi was brought down and replaced with a religiously oriented government that was diametrically opposed to the gulf monarchies.
The current Saudi state was founded in 1932, a few years before oil was discovered. However, this is actually the third Saudi state. The relationship between the al-Saud and the Wahhabi religious doctrine has persisted through each of these states, even in times of crisis. This is because the rulers have understood the effectiveness of using religion as a form of political legitimization. Unlike the monarchies in Iran and Iraq, every Saudi state claimed its legitimacy on the basis of the connection to Islam.
Mohammad bin Salman understands that his transformative vision for the country is questioning the very “raison d’etre” of the nation itself; both its founding myth and what it means to be Saudi. He claims to be returning Saudi Arabia to a purer and more authentic version of itself as he saves the country from the legacy and remnants of the Sahwa.
In 1990, Salman al-Audah gave a speech implying that the Saudi nation was founded on the basis of religion and the principle of “promoting truth and preventing vice” and that if they abandoned those principles the nation would fall. Audah’s contradictory narrative of the guiding purpose and uniting principles of the country remain a major threat to the authority of the state — especially as the state tries to ease away from religion leaving space for the re-emergence of an Islamic-oriented opposition group like the Sahwa.
If Salman al-Audah is ultimately sentenced to death, it will be the greatest gamble the incoming ruler has taken. How will the cleric’s 14 million followers on Twitter react to his death?
The stakes are high and it will be either the end of the Sahwa or the end of Mohammad bin Salman.
